Abolish the Visa Waiver Program

FAIR has consistently questioned both the need for and the advisability of the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) that was adopted as a pilot project at the urging of the tourist industry in 1986 and became operational in 1988. After numerous extensions, the program was made permanent in 2000 despite expressions of concern not just by FAIR, but also by the Justice Depatment's Inspector General, FBI Director Louis Freeh, and other immigration and security experts.

“[The] potentially greatest risk to the national security and illegal immigration appears to come from nonimmigrants visiting under the Visa Waiver Pilot Program.”

Department of Justice Inspector General Michael Bromwich Congressional testimony, May 5, 1999

“[Immigration inspectors] do not query all Visa Waiver Pilot Program passport numbers against the computerized lookout system" and "terrorists, criminals, and alien smugglers have attempted to gain entry into the United States through the Visa Waiver Pilot Program.”

Bromwich, Congressional testimony, July 29, 1999.

The VWP allows countries from designated countries (27 at present) which have had low rates of visa refusals by U.S. consular officers over recent years to travel to and enter the United States without having to apply for a U.S. visa. This means that they bypass the normal consular scrutiny that is intended to deny persons who represent a threat to the country for health, criminal or security reasons as well as potential illegal immigrants who have no intention of returning to their homeland after their travel to the United States. The only requirement is that the traveller present a passport from one of the visa waiver countries at the port of entry, have a round-trip ticket, and be planning to stay less than 90 days.

While the advantage of the VWP to the tourism industry by promoting tourism is obvious, so too is the security danger. There is no guarantee that potential terrorists will not have passports from visa waiver countries. Zacaraias Moussaoui, the indicted "20^th terrorist" entered the United States on a French passport. Richard Reid, the arrested terrorist who tried to blow up an airliner with explosives in his shoe, was travelling to the United States on a British passport. Neither required a visa under the waiver program. Ahmad Ajaj, a participant in the first terrorist plot to blow up the World Trade Center in New York in 1993 was fortunately found to be carrying explosives and arrested upon his entry. He was travelling on a Swedish passport.

Our Security Requires a Two-Step Screening Process

It is absurd to assume that simply because persons come from a country with a low rate of visa refusals that they can be safely assumed to represent no risk to the United States or that they are bona fide visitors who have no intention of staying as illegal immigrants. That is the assumption that underlies the VWP. Normal screening of travelers to the United States involves applicant screening by U.S. consular officers abroad as well as screening by inspectors at U.S. ports of entry. By eliminating the consular screening the burden is shifted entirely to the immigration inspectors, who are under extreme pressure to process incoming passengers quickly after cursory examination of their documents.

"It is clearly negligent to be operating a visa waiver program for a growing list of countries which allows normal consular officer screening abroad to be by-passed when there is no follow-up verification mechanism in place to determine whether the visa-waiver privilege is being abused."

- FAIR Executive Director Dan Stein, congressional testimony, March 18, 1999

If the screening at the U.S. consulates were restored in the current VWP countries, the chances would be improved for spotting counterfeit travel documents. It would also allow follow-up contacts with local officials in any cases of applicants with possible criminal or security grounds of ineligibility. This currently abandoned screening process is the front-line of the nation's security system against international terrorism, and should never have been waived.

The State Department's Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, Mary Ryan, testified on February 10, 2000 in favor of making the VWP a permanent feature of immigration law. At that time, Ryan, who retired in 2002 while under attack for the lax visa policies that contributed to the visa issuance of the 9/11 terrorists, apparently saw the program as a budget saver for her agency. That, however, changed when the Department of State was given authority to collect visa fees to defray consular operating costs, as Ryan acknowledged in an October 17, 2001 Senate hearing on new controls to combat terrorism. While abolishing the VWP would require the restoration of consular positions in the 27 countries that were removed following adoption of the VWP, this could be done over one or two years without cost to the U.S. taxpayer.

Tightened Measures Following the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks

Even with an improved machine-readable passport and a biometric identifier, there still will be less security than if there is a two-step screening process. The U.S. consular offices abroad should be in a better position to recognize stolen or counterfeit passports and work with local officials towards that end than is possible even under the best of circumstances by the immigration inspectors at the ports of entry.

To see how FAIR's position on the need to abolish the visa waiver program fits into our overall legislative agenda, see FAIR's Immigration Reform Agenda for the 110th Congress.

Updated 12/03